Archive for the ‘Disabled’ Category

A Racing Incident – Claims of Go Kart Driver Injured by Driver with Down Syndrome to be Decided by a Jury (NY)

August 20, 2015

Corneli v. Adventure Racing Co., LLC (New York)
(trial court disposition)

Plaintiff participated as driver in go kart activities at the defendant’s racing entertainment facility, and he was injured when his go kart was struck by the go kart operated by defendant C.S., a seventeen-year-old who suffered from Down’s Syndrome.  Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the facility, alleging that the facility was negligent in the ownership, operation, management, maintenance supervision, staff training and control of the go kart ride and in the supervision and control of C.S.  The lawsuit was also filed against C.S. for negligently operating and driving the go kart, and C.S.’s alleged mother and father for negligent entrustment and allowing C.S. to negligently operate the go kart in a dangerous manner.

The defendant go kart facility filed a motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assumption of risk.  C.S.’s alleged mother and father filed cross-claims against the facility, and the mother and father filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that they were not responsible for C.S.’s conduct.  Plaintiff then filed his own motion for summary judgment.  The New York U.S. District Court addressed each motion in turn.
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Wild Ride – Paraplegic Injured on Roller Coaster Loses Jury Verdict (CA)

July 2, 2015

Rogers v. Magic Mountain, LLC (California)

Plaintiff was involved in an accident in 1996, which caused him to suffer from paraplegia and related medical complications.  In 2010, he rode the X2 “4th Dimension” roller coaster at Six Flags Magic Mountain, an amusement park in Valencia, California.  While on the ride, plaintiff suffered a fracture to his right femur.  Plaintiff did not feel the injury as a result of his paraplegia.  A few days later, his right leg was amputated after blood clotting blocked the flow of blood to his leg.  Plaintiff sued the amusement park and the ride manufacturer, alleging premises liability, general negligence and products liability.

The amusement park filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court.  The case continued, and a ten day jury trial ensued.  After trial, the jury issued a special verdict, finding that the amusement park was negligent, but that its negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff.  As to the ride manufacturer, the jury found that (1) the ride did not have potential risks that were known at the time of their design, manufacture and sale that would support a failure to warn claim, and (2) the design of the ride was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff, but that the risks of the ride did not outweigh the benefits of the design.  Therefore, the jury found that neither defendant had legal responsibility for the harm caused to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff appealed the decision contending that the special verdict was defective and the evidence was insufficient to support the special verdict.  However, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants.  The Court noted that the plaintiff had not objected to the special verdict or any of its stipulated changes.  Regardless, the Court did not find any inconsistency, ambiguity, or unresolved issue in the special verdict.  Plaintiff complained that the jury had improperly allocated 100% fault to the plaintiff without first finding that the plaintiff was negligent.  However, the Court explained that the specific allocation of fault to the plaintiff was merely an “irregularity,” and not an “inconsistency.”  The jury had already determined that neither defendant’s was responsible (the park’s negligence did not cause the harm and the risk of the manufacturer’s design did not outweigh its benefits).  As a result, the Court noted that “it [did] not matter whether plaintiff was negligent or not — he [could not] recover from defendants.”  According to the Court, “the issues of negligence and causation were properly presented to the jury in the special verdict form.”  The Court was also convinced that “there was ample evidence from which the jury could properly conclude that [manufacturer] was unaware of potential risks at the time the X2 vehicles were designed.”

Shooting Blind

August 1, 2012

Blind Industries and Services of Md. v. Route 40 Paintball Park (Maryland)
(A legally blind individual was denied the chance to play paintball at the defendant’s facility, and the plaintiff advocate group filed a claim on his behalf alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); the defendant failed to produce evidence regarding a prior personal injury civil suit and the plaintiff filed a motion to compel, which was denied.)

In its demand for production of documents as part of discovery in the litigation, the plaintiff advocate group requested “[a]ll Documents and Communications relating to complaints, grievances, citations, or claims made against the [defendant] by any person for . . . negligence of any type, or safety hazards of any type.”  After the defendant served its responses, the plaintiff noted that the defendant had failed to produce documents relating to a tort action it had discovered alleging unsafe conditions at the defendant’s paintball fields.  The defendant argued that the prior lawsuit was not relevant to the plaintiff’s ADA claim.

The District Court ruled that the defendant was required to only produce copies of any publicly filed documents pertaining to the prior lawsuit.  The Court explained that requiring the defendant to conduct an extensive review and production concerning prior cases “would violate the principles of proportionality.”  Although there is a relatively low standard of relevance required for discovery, the Court felt it was too much of a burden on the defense to produce more than what was part of the public record.  The defendant did contend the blind individual’s visual impairment “posed a safety concern,” but the connection of that allegation with prior claims of unsafe conditions was clearly limited.  The fact that the documents sought by the plaintiff also implicated the attorney-client privilege played a role in the Court’s decision.

As part of its motion to compel, the plaintiff also sought further responses from the defendant regarding the factual basis underlying the defendant’s affirmative defenses, asking that the affirmative defenses be stricken if additional information was not provided. However, the Court found the initial responses, “[t]aken in totality,” to be sufficient.

NOTE: This is certainly a positive decision from a defense perspective, considering the broad standard of “relevancy” in discovery.  Defendants are always concerned about a plaintiff’s ability to make their life unnecessarily difficult (and costly) via the discovery process.  It appears that a fair balance was reached in this instance.